A Review of:
Gospel and Law: Contrast or Continuum? The Hermeneutics of Dispensationalism and Covenant Theology, by Daniel P. Fuller. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980. xiii + 217 pp. $10.96, paper.
By Douglas Moo,
TrinJ 3 (1982): 99-102.
Few issues are as determinative for as many areas of theology as that of the relationship between gospel and law. The nature of the atonement, the means by which the benefits of the cross are appropriated by individuals, the locus of ethical norms, the continuity of redemptive history -- all are radically affected by the manner in which gospel and law are related. The rival theological systems of covenant theology and dispensationalism, particularly prominent in American evangelicalism, are to some degree the logical extensions of different approaches to this issue. In light of this, the relative paucity of contemporary studies of the issue is surprising. Now, however, Daniel Fuller has provided us with a fresh and provocative examination of gospel and law.
Fuller, who is Professor of Hermeneutics at Fuller Theological Seminary, has reflected for many years on the topic with which he deals. His 1957 Northern Baptist doctoral dissertation was a critical examination of "The Hermeneutics of Dispensationalism." At this time, Fuller informs us in his foreword, he was committed to a traditional covenant theology, in opposition to dispensationalism. Since then, however, Fuller has come to question that system's approach to gospel and law also and now advocates a position which he advances as an alternative to both dispensationalism and covenant theology. Gospel and Law: Contrast or Continuum? is the presentation of that position. For purpose of description, the volume may be divided into three parts: historical analysis (chaps. 1-3), the statement of the central thesis against the background of Paul's view of the law (chap. 4) and implications of the thesis for certain basic tenets of dispensationalism (chaps. 5-7).
In his historical analysis, Fuller notes that both dispensationalists and covenant theologians are very concerned to keep separate law and gospel. Older dispensationalism, represented by the original Scofield Bible and L. S. Chafer, accomplished this by a longitudinal division, according to which law characterized God's dealings with Israel (in the OT and again after the rapture of the church) and grace His approach to the church. For these dispensationalists, as for Darby initially, Fuller argues, the rigid separation of Israel and the church was basically a means to isolate the church from the "virus" of legalism. More recent dispensationalists (C. C. Ryrie is chosen as the prime example), responding to the criticism that Chafer's position logically entailed two different ways of salvation, have blurred the distinction Israel/law and church/grace by arguing that law and grace exist side by side in every dispensation. In doing so, however, dispensationalism has both abandoned the main rationale for separating Israel and the church, and has become essentially indistinguishable from the position taken by covenant theologians. Hence, both contemporary dispensationalists and covenant theologians find grace and law mixed throughout Scripture and seek to "explain away" clear statements to the effect that works are required for salvation on the basis of an "analogy-of-faith" principle. This Fuller finds problematic. Is it likely, he asks, that the biblical writers intended, or their readers discerned, transitions from law to grace and vice versa within single paragraphs? It is the unnaturalness of such a distinction which leads Fuller to formulate his own proposal.
Essentially, Fuller argues that faith and works should be viewed not as antithetical, but as inseparable parts of what he terms the "obedience of faith." The enjoyment of all God's promises arc contingent upon the fulfillment of this condition, rendering unnecessary the "elaborate division" between faith and works and promise and law found in Scripture by both dispensationalists and covenant theologians. Fuller seeks to remove exegetical objections to his view by arguing that the two key pauline texts in which a clear distinction between faith and works/law is enunciated -- Gal 3:10-12 and Rom 9:30-10:10 -- contrast faith with Jewish perversions of the law rather than the revelatory law itself. Fuller also attempts to blunt theological objections by explaining how his view does justice to the reformation principles of sola gratia, sola fide and sola gloria. Comparing God to a workman, Fuller contends that these principles are adhered to as long as the recipient of the workman's activity gratefully acknowledges fully his utter dependence on the workman. Crucial is the distinction between "works of faith" (which Scripture demands) and "works in which men boast" (which pervert Scripture).
In the final three chapters, Fuller shows how the acceptance of his position removes difficulties inherent in the dispensational understanding of the Abrahamic covenant, the Kingdom of God and the "parenthesis church." In each instance, the desire to separate conditional promises with the works necessary to attain them and unconditional promises, received solely by faith, results in the establishment of unnatural and unscriptural distinctions.
Gospel and Law is a stimulating and often penetrating examination of a central theological issue. By pointing out the bifurcations of Scripture implicit in most traditional explanations of the relationship between gospel and law, Fuller has rendered a real service to the theological community. His analysis and critique of dispensationalism is particularly insightful, although I am not sure he has always represented the position accurately. And all this is done in language which should be readily comprehensible to the reasonably well-read pastor. It is, however, the lot of the theological pathfinder to be exposed to attack from various quarters. Fuller, in advancing a thesis at variance with two of the major theological systems, will undoubtedly be caught in a crossfire of criticism. In advancing my own criticisms, however, I do not speak consciously as an advocate of either of these systems, but as one who is also seeking a clear path through the theological thicket of law and gospel.
I) The scope of the book. As I read Gospel and Law, I had the feeling that I was reading at least two distinct books: one an analysis and critique of dispensationalism and the other an historical, exegetical and theological examination of law and gospel. Because of this, the discussion sometimes lacks focus and clarity; more seriously, it sometimes lacks depth. Thus, for instance, the attempt to explain Paul's contrast of faith and works in the manner suggested by Fuller is grounded in only two texts. Yet several others -- e.g., Romans 3-4, 2 Corinthians 3, Romans 7 -- contain material which at first sight casts serious doubt on the viability of Fuller's thesis. Certainly a discerning reader must remain unconvinced of Fuller's proposal as long as these texts remain unexplained.
2) Superficiality of historical analysis. Fuller acutely diagnoses some genuine difficulties in traditional approaches to the issue of gospel and law. For example, the antithesis set up by Calvin and others between "righteousness by faith" and "righteousness by law" suggests that the OT genuinely taught such a ~ legal righteousness-a possibility which Fuller rightly questions. But at other points in his historical analysis, it must be asked whether Fuller has really understood the positions he criticizes or allowed sufficiently for the nuances of various approaches. Thus, in the presentation of his basic thesis, Fuller stresses I the "inseparable connection between faith and resulting works" (p. 113) as if this were a new position. But Calvin himself states that "faith and good works must cleave together" and argues that the benefits of justification and sanctification "are joined by an everlasting and indissoluble bond" (Institutes, Ill. 16.1) -- and this has surely become the normative "covenant theology" position. If this is all that Fuller is saying here, he is saying nothing new; if he is saying something new, he has failed to- indicate clearly the manner in which it differs from traditional formulations.
Similarly, the accusation that Calvin was guilty of the "Galatian heresy" because he "could never predicate sola fide to sanctification" (p. 117) is surely a misunderstanding of Calvin's position, for he stressed that the gift of sanctification was bestowed with justification (Institutes, Ill. 16.1) and viewed good works as the gift of God (III. 15.20). Furthermore, the selection of Calvin as the key representative of "covenant theology" introduces a potentially distorting simplification into the historical picture. "Covenant theology" generally designates the distinctively covenantal theological structure developed by Cocceius, Witsius and others a century after Calvin, and this tradition differed from Calvin's theology in some significant ways-not least on the relationship of law and gospel (see on the early Reformation development of covenantal thought J. Wayne Baker, Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant: The Other Re- formed Tradition (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980]).
3) Inadequate definitions of key terms. In a book devoted to Gospel and Law, one would expect some indication of the way in which these key terms are being used. Judging from usage, Fuller is apparently using the former as equivalent to grace-an identification which can create difficulties because the NT does not simply interchange these. But even more problematic is Fuller's apparent failure to recognize the two clearly distinct ways in which "law" is used. On the one hand, "law" has established itself in theological circles as a term designating anything that commands or condemns a person; Paul, on the" other hand, uses the term in the vast majority of cases of the Mosaic law. The need to distinguish these usages is absolutely critical. Thus, for instance, Paul could very well maintain that believers are subject to law in the first sense (cf. "the law of Christ," Gal 6:2) while claiming release from the law in the second sense (cf. Rom 7:5-6). To ignore this vital distinction and suggest, as Fuller does, that "works of faith involve doing all that is commanded in Scripture" (p. 110), is to raise seriously the question on what basis believers can ignore the scriptural command of circumcision or the offering of sacrifices.
4) Exegetical weaknesses. As we have seen, Fuller seeks to reconcile his position with Paul's teaching by means of an exegetical analysis of two crucial texts, Galatians 3 and Rom 9:30-10:10. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of Fuller's exegesis, but a couple of comments on his interpretation of Galatians 3 are in order. a) If the "works of the law" which bring a curse (v 10) are simply misunderstandings of what the law requires, why did Christ have to die to remove that curse (v 13)? The substitutionary nature of that death as the means of removing the curse makes sense only if that curse involved a necessary, objective condemnation of all men based on failure to live up to the genuine demands of the law. In other words, if the problem confronted by men involved simply failure to understand the law, because of sin, Christ need not have taken on himself the curse of the law. b) Fuller recognizes that his "crucial thesis" is rendered "invalid" if the nomos which is set in antithesis to the promise in Gal 3:18 is the revelatory law. Consequently, he devotes an appendix to an attempt to show that nomos here must be the law as misunderstood by Jewish legalists. But Fuller provides little reason beyond a priori arguments to substantiate this view. And against it, and for the view that the revelatory law is intended here, can be marshalled some strong arguments: i) v 17, as Fuller admits, clearly speaks of the revelatory law; ii) vv 19-25, when compared with texts such as Rom 5: 20, must be understood as dealing with the divine purpose for the revelatory law; iii) since the circumcision issue is prominent in Galatians, and this certainly involves a clear command of the revelatory law, Paul's argument with the Judaizers must, to some extent, involve the law per se. To argue that the problem in Galatians involves only a misunderstanding of the law is to ignore the obvious temporal salvation-historical nature of Paul's argumentation throughout chaps. 3-4. Thus, it is not nomos by itself, or even ta erga tau nomou which Paul uses to designate legalism, but ek tou nomou/ek ton ergon tou nomou -- a false dependence on works/law for salvation.
A further area of exegetical weakness is Fuller's failure to ground his position positively in detailed study of biblical texts. The analysis of Gal 3:10-12 and Rom 9:30-10:10 serves the purpose of removing objections to Fuller's view, but falls far short of establishing his view. The extent to which Fuller fails to provide exegetical support for his view is illustrated by the fact that he never justifies his interpretation of his key phrase, "the obedience of faith," in the sense of "the obedience which faith manifests"-this, when many argue that the genitive construction involved is epexegetic, yielding the interpretation "the obedience which is faith."
5) Sola gratia? In order to reconcile his view that faith and works together secure the forgiveness of sins with the principle of sola gratia, Fuller stresses the idea of motive in God's grace and argues that sola gratia is preserved as long as men do not in their works think they are "supplying God with some need" (p. 109). However, God's grace is conditional upon men approaching God with the proper attitude. Two questions may be asked of this formulation. First, does Fuller's understanding of grace cohere with the meaning of the term in Scripture and in the Reformers? Fuller bases his idea of "motive" in charis on a definition drawn from Webster's Dictionary and uses the analogy of a checkout clerk at a grocery story to illustrate his meaning. Neither inspires confidence that Fuller has grasped the biblical meaning of the term. Second, Fuller's position demands that "works," with which grace is often contrasted, mean actions, done with a view to boasting. But a text such as Rom 9: I 1-12 strongly suggests that "works" in Paul means any action performed by men. In this case sola gratia must exclude any work, whatever its motivation.
6) Promise and Law. On p. 203, Fuller asserts: ". . . Paul regarded the revelatory law and the promise as one and the same," on p. 86: "Either one [Christ and the law) or both will impart righteousness," and on p. 202: "... Paul affirms that the content and thought structure of the law is just as capable as the promise of making a man righteous before God." Now, it may be that Fuller has unintentionally overstated himself in these instances, but the general tenor of the book does suggest a melding of promise and law as theological categories and OT and NT as temporal categories to an extent that meaningful distinctions cease to exist. But the wiping out of these distinctions, to this extent, entails a radical revision of large segments of traditional theology -- a revision which can hardly be justified biblically. Ultimately, promise, the pronouncement of what God has done, and law, the announcement of what man must do (as Thielicke [Evangelical Faith, 2:207) contrasts them: "offer of God" and "claim of God"), must be distinguished if the gospel is to retain any necessary significance. And the ignoring of the crucial salvation-historical shift at the cross flies in the face of the essence of Paul's gospel: the revelation of the righteousness of God apart from the law (Rom 3:21). And what is to be said of Gal 2:2lb ("For if righteousness comes through the law, Christ died in vain") or Gal 3:2lb ("For if a law had been given which was able to impart life, then righteousness would indeed have been based on law")? A facile equation of promise and law can hardly be characterized as the "face-value" interpretation of the pauline evidence.
It has by now become clear that, however attractive and stimulating the thesis of Gospel and Law may be, it suffers from some serious flaws. While any treatment of a topic so large and complex is bound to have weaknesses, I feel that the weaknesses in this case are serious enough to render the thesis unacceptable. But Fuller is to be commended for seriously and innovatively dealing with this issue and it is hoped that his work will stimulate others to seek out new paths in the attempt to formulate a biblical theology of gospel and law.
Douglas J. Moo
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
Deerfield, Illinois
