VanTil_Transformation

Van Til, Common Grace, and the Transformation of Culture

by Robert A. Lotzer*

In the following treatment of Van Til's view of common grace and its application to the Christian's approach to culture we can do no better in beginning our discussion than with Van Til's own admission:

"We realize that the practical difficulties will always be great enough. We realize, too, that, theoretically, the question is exceedingly complicated. And we realize that we have a long way to go. But the direction in which we ought to work is, in our humble opinion, reasonably clear" (Common Grace, 95).

Van Til would argue that "a [Reformed] Christian worldview alone presents a comprehensive interpretation of human experience, growing out of [Reformed] Christian presuppositions, without which the world has no meaning or coherence" (VanDrunen).

Therefore, Van Til would readily agree with Abraham Kuyper "in affirming two kinds of science, believing and unbelieving," although Van Til criticized Kuyper for not going far enough in some of the lower aspects of the natural sciences [Kuyper thought we could find more commonality in measuring and counting where sin and regeneration do not "directly" affect the unbeliever's abilities]. Kuyper made a distinction between the lower territories of knowledge [i.e., physical sciences, the lower spiritual sciences, logic] and the higher territories of knowledge [knowledge of God; i.e. spiritual realm]. Kuyper argued that common grace allows for cooperation between believers and unbelievers in the lower territories where the unbeliever is not self-consciously aware of the radical epistemological differences between believer and unbeliever. It is here that Kuyper was willing to concede "epistemological" common ground between the believer and unbeliever.

But, for Van Til there is no area of human knowledge that is not "ultimately" differentiated between the believer and unbeliever. There is no such thing as "brute facts," i.e., bare, uninterpreted facts of reality and knowledge. Therefore, Kuyper's concession would be an anathema to Van Til. However, it must be pointed out that even Van Til makes the following comment:

"Yet unbelievers are more self-conscious epistemologically in the dimension of religion than in the dimension of mathematics. The process of differentiation has not proceeded as far in the lower, as it has in the higher, dimensions" (Common Grace, 85).

One has to wonder how different the statement is with what Kuyper was saying.

Van Til speaks of two senses of knowledge that man possesses. He made a distinction between the "ultimate perspective" and the "relative perspective" of knowledge (see Introduction to Systematic Theology, pp. 26-27, 82-83). From an ultimate perspective, there is an absolute antithesis between the unbeliever and any knowledge of God and therefore, since all knowledge is derivative from the true God, everything else. The unbeliever doesn't now anything "truly," from an ultimate perspective. He is as spiritually blind as a mole to all truth, even in the realm of natural things.

But from a relative perspective, the unbeliever knows truth, "after a fashion," only because they are living on borrowed, or stolen, capital from a Christian perspective, since they are never able to ultimately suppress God's truth completely and since they do not work out their own presuppositions consistently (which is true of believers as well). The relative perspective is due to God's common grace, which serves as preparation in the unbeliever for saving grace, that is only if he is of the elect.

"By virtue of their creation in God's image, by virtue of the ineradicable sense of deity within them and by virtue of God's restraining general grace, those who hate God, yet in a restricted sense know God, and do good" (Introduction to Systematic Theology, 27).

"Though all of natural man's interpretations are from an ultimate point of view equally unsatisfactory, there is a sense in which he knows something about everything, about God as well as about the world, and that in this sense he knows more about the world than about God. This distinction is not only true, but important to make. Many non-Christians have been great scientists. Often non-Christians have a better knowledge of the things of this world than Christians have" (Introduction to Systematic Theology, 83).

"No Christian can escape facing the fact that many non-Christian scientists have discovered much truth about nature" (Introduction to Systematic Theology, 85).

"It is only by way of "metaphysical" common ground that the believer and unbeliever are enabled to investigate all territories of knowledge" ("From Condition to State," Jan Van Viliet, 79). For Van Til, this metaphysical common ground is rooted in all humanity's solidarity with Adam (who was created in the image of God and where God's common grace was generally applied to all).

However, Van Til seems to argue that over time this common realm (from a relative perspective) is gradually diminishing as both Christians and non-Christians become increasingly self-conscious of their epistemological differences (i.e., living in accord with their presuppositions), gradually removing the commonness among them (Common Grace, 82-83). At this point it would be helpful to include an important qualification:

"It may be helpful to emphasize here that Van Til's development is really a development of something which exists only in the impenetrable mind of God" ("From Condition to State," Jan Van Viliet, 97, emphasis added).

A point that needs to be stressed here that Van Til is not always clear on, is that even as history is advancing towards the ultimate differentiation between believers and non-believers, the believer remains totally depraved as well. Van Til seems clearest when describing the nature of the Fall among the unbeliever, or covenant breaker. But there seems to be a lack of an equally important "emphasis" in his thinking that even the regenerated believer remains sinful and rebellious in his thinking (he too is a covenant breaker; Christ alone is the covenant keeper!). [This is not to say that Van Til never makes this point, only that it is not emphasized to the degree that the fallen condition of the unbeliever is emphasized.]

Because of growing diminishing commonness between the believer and the unbeliever, the cultural mandate given at creation is therefore in the hands of Christians alone and it is their responsibility to pursue the goal of eliminating sin from the universe (knowing that they will never reach that goal in this present age). They alone have the cultural edifice to fix the problem and therefore, they must not compromise the Christian ethical program (VanDrunen and Common Grace, 118-119).

Nevertheless, "due to common grace, they (the believer) may engage in limited "as if" or "mankind in general" cooperation with unbelievers and put them in service in the accomplishment of the cultural mandate" (VanDrunen, see Van Til, Common Grace, 84). As long as we live in an early stage of an undifferentiated stage of development we may find many areas of commonness by which we may work together. [One wonders how Van Til knows whether we are in an early or latter undifferentiated stage!]

Again, it needs to be stressed, as Van Til himself admits, that because the differentiation is not yet complete, there is an "unlimited" or as Van Til states, "a larger [metaphysical] common territory than Kuyper allows for" between the unbeliever and believer.

"Looking at the matter thus allows for legitimate cooperation with non-Christian scientists; it allows for a larger "common" territory than Kuyper allows for, but this larger territory is common with a qualification" (Common Grace, 44).

"We are to think of non-believers as members of the mass of humankind in which the process of differentiation has not yet been completed" (Common Grace, 84).

"Yet unbeliever's are more self-conscious epistemologically in the dimension of religion than in the dimension of mathematics. The process of differentiation has not proceeded as far in the lower, as it has in the higher, dimensions" (Common Grace, 85).

"If we can say of one who is elect that he was at one point in his history totally depraved, we can, with equal justice, say of a reprobate that he was at one point in his history in some sense good" (Common Grace, 94).

One wishes that Van Til would have explained more fully how the believer can cooperate with the unbeliever in this "as if" level of cooperation, especially in the realm of social ethic, social sciences, and even in apologetics. For instance, Van Til makes it clear that based on Romans 2:14-15 that the unbeliever knows the law of God written upon his heart and "sin has not been able to efface all this requisitional material from the consciousness of man" (Common Grace, 88) but he simply goes on to explain how the unbeliever constantly seeks to "choke the voice of God" though never able to fully eradicate it. One wishes that Van Til would have gone on to explain how then the believer can work with this knowledge of the law of God written on the heart of the unbeliever to find an area of common territory upon which to build a common social ethic in this temporal period of history before the differentiation is complete. If there is this [metaphysical] common territory, that Van Til admits there is, shouldn't we seek to find areas where we can build upon this metaphysical common territory to help the unbeliever begin to build the foundation of understanding the facts of the gospel?

It is true that the end of the unbeliever, if he continues in his unbelief at the time of complete differentiation, is judgment and condemnation with no hope of an eternal common experience of joy with the believer. However, how do Christians work with unbelievers before the differentiation is complete in finding a common standard by which they might work together to improve society? But for Van Til, to do this is only to "fall back into a scholastic way of thinking . . . in our notions about natural theology and natural ethics" (Common Grace, 94).

However Van Til goes on to argue that "at the same time, Christians ought to seek to hasten the process of differentiation between Christians and non-Christians and diminishment of common grace by striving to make non-Christians more epistemologically self-conscious" (VanDrunen).

We seek, on the one hand, to make men epistemologically self-conscious all long the line. As Reformed Christians we do all we can, by building out own educational institutions and otherwise, to make men see that so-called neutral weighing and measuring is a terrible sin in the sight of God . . . So while we seek with all our power to hasten the process of differentiation in every dimension we are yet thankful, on the other hand, for "the day of grace", the day of undeveloped differentiation (Common Grace, 85).

So Van Til, while thankful that the differentiation has not be fully realized between the believer and the unbeliever, nevertheless Van Til says that it is our duty as Reformed Christians to press or hasten the process of differentiation in every dimension of life. The question that must be asked, which Van Til never really dealt with, is to what extent "practically" do Christians follow Kuyper in attempting to transform the society into something distinctly Christian? How do we "practically" hasten this process of differentiation? One way in which Van Til encourages Christians to "hasten the process" is by creating Christian day schools "to make [natural] men see that so-called neutral weighing and measuring is a terrible sin in the sight of God" (Common Grace, 84-85).

VanDrunen states that John Muether has said that Van Til often recommended Henry R. Van Til's The Calvinistic Concept of Culture, which is decidedly in the Kuyperian, as a helpful approach to concrete cultural concerns.

* Much of the previous material is taken from David VanDrunen's forthcoming "The Importance of the Penultimate: Reformed Social Thought and the Contemporary Critiques of the Liberal Society."

Also see, Jan Van Vliet, "From Condition to State: Critical Reflections on Cornelius Van Til's Doctrine of Common Grace in WTJ 61 (1999), 73-100.

Questions Towards Further Reflection and Conclusion:

1. Most of the above I have no problem with. I think Van Til was exactly right in pointing out the inconsistency in Kuyper. I also have no problem with Van Til's metaphysical and epistemological distinctions in the distinction between the believer and unbeliever. However, my question would be what do we do with all this area of metaphysical commonness between the believer and unbeliever? It seems that Van Til opens the door to much commonness but then closes it out of fear of what that opened door will mean or to put it in Van Til's language, less we slip back into "scholastic thinking."

I would want to see us make use of this commonness in a much more fruitful way than it seems Van Til was and Van Tilians are willing to do (although VanDrunen is doing some really helpful work in this area and he himself is a Van Tilian!)

2. As for Kline, he too was a Van Tilian, yet he certainly seems to open the door wider for interaction between believers and unbelievers in the realm of common grace, although I don't know of any writing of his that deals specifically with any of these issues, even to the degree that Van Til himself has done.

I ceratinly think that Kline's two-registers would fit with what Van Til is saying and I think both of them would agree with the two-kingdom approach to society (at least tentatively in regards to Van Til and with a lot of qualifications). Van Til even quotes from Calvin's Institutes (2.2.13) approvingly in Calvin's distinction between "heavenly things" and "earthly things," [rightly understood!] One wonders at the end of the day whether or not Van Til so qualifies the two to make any use out of a two-kingdom approach.

However, what do we do with this commonness in the lower register? That would be the question that remains in my mind regarding Van Til's approach and whether or not we are to seek a neo-Calvinist, transformationists approach to society or whether the two-kingdom social ethic.

From my initial reading on this, it seems that Van Til would NOT be open to a two-kingdom approach to social ethics and that it would be falling back into a "scholastic way of thinking," which Van Til tried so diligently to steer clear of. But there is much more work to be done here, especially in light of Van Til's own qualification that I used to begin the above paper.